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PRIMARY AND EXCESS INSURERS AND THEIR
COMMON INSURED: THE TRIANGULAR
RELATIONSHIP WITH NO LOVE LOST
The development of liability insurance involved the formation of primary and
excess insurance carriers to fully protect the insured's interests. This Note examines
the evolution of the insurer-insured relationshop, the movement awayfrom imposing
an implied covenant ofgoodfaith on the insurer andtoward applying a strict liability
standard, the insured's duty of goodfaith to his or her insurance company, and the
nature of theprimary-excess insurer relationshp. This Note concludes that the im-
position of the goodfaith doctrine characteristic of the insured-insurer context is
inapposite to theprimary-excess insurer context and that a new, independent duty of
care between the excess and primary insurers should be applied.
INTRODUCTION
LIABILITY INSURANCE originated as a device to protect an
individual from financial hardship or ruin due to an adverse
liability judgment. Purchasing insurance transferred the risk of a
debilitating judgment to the insurance company in exchange for
the insured's payment of regular policy premiums.'
The development of the insured-insurer relationship led to the
imposition of a duty of good faith and fair dealing on the insurer
to protect the rights of the less powerful individual policyholder.'
An insured who sought greater protection from the risk of poten-
tially large adverse judgments could insure against that risk
through the mechanism of excess insurance. This supplemental
insurance protected the insured from liability exceeding the pri-
mary insurance policy limits.3
This Note analyzes the triangular relationship between the ex-
cess and primary insurers and their common insured. This trian-
gular relationship is discussed in light of the situation which arises
when the primary insurer refuses to settle or defend a claim
against its insured, thereby exposing the insured to an excess lia-
bility judgment.4 The Note further examines the repercussions of
the primary insurer's faulty decisionmaking which result in legal
1. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibiliyfor Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REV.
1136, 1177 n.99 (1954).
2. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
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liability to both the insured5 and the excess insurer6 for judgment
exceeding primary policy limits.
This Note first examines the judicial development of the in-
sured-insurer relationship from its inception7 to present treat-
ment.8 The current view shuns strict contract formalities9 and
recognizes that the insurer's "power to affect the interests of in-
sured as well as its own interests should be accompanied by re-
sponsibility for its exercise, regardless of the fact that such
responsibility is not expressed in the policy."' 0 This modem con-
sumer-oriented approach recognizes that the basic purpose of in-
surance is to provide the insured with "peace of mind."'" To
further this purpose, the insurer must be compelled to provide a
standard of service which will further such goals. 2
Second, this Note considers the creation of a fiduciary duty
between the insurer and its insured and its effect on the insurance
industry. The development of this duty from the early establish-
ment of the implied convenant of good faith and fair dealing to
the recent move toward strict liability for insurers for improper
handling of the insured's interests is then examined. 3
The third section of this Note examines the extent to which an
insured owes a duty of good faith to his or her insurance com-
pany.' 4 This section concludes that while it is inappropriate to
impose on the insured a reciprocal duty of good faith to his or her
insurer, the insured should not be permitted to ignore the insurer's
legitimate interests with impunity. 5
Finally, in light of the development of the insured-insurer rela-
tionship and the duty of good faith, this Note examines the nature
of the primary-excess insurer relationship to determine whether
either the primary or excess insurer may benefit from a doctrine
similar to the insurer's established duty to deal fairly with the in-
5. See infra notes 53-90 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 191-209 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
10. Keeton, supra note I, at 1138.
11. Note, The Emerging Fiduciary Obligations and Strict Liability in Insurance Law, 14
CAL. W.L. REv. 358, 358 (1977).
12. Parks, Recovery of Extra-Contract Damages in Suits on Insurance Policies, 9 Fo-
RUM 43, 55 (1973). A reasonable standard of service includes a sum equal to the insured's
policy limits available to settle claims against the insured.
13. See infra notes 25-115 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 131-60 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
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terests of its insureds."s This Note concludes that application of
either the equitable subrogation or good faith doctrines is inap-
propriate in the primary-excess insurer context. 7 While both pri-
mary and excess insurers have legitimate interests in their
relationship to a common insured, application of standards
designed to protect the insured will not effectively protect insur-
ance companies. Instead, this Note recommends the creation of a
new, independent duty of care between the excess and primary
insurance carriers.' 8
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSURED-INSURER RELATIONSHIP
A. Early View Favors Insurers
Early twentieth century courts have adhered to strict contract
theories favoring the insurer. 9 The insurer and insured were
viewed traditionally as equal parties to a contract.20 This view
severely curtailed the insured's ability to recover in excess of the
policy limits.2 Insurers rarely would settle claims against their
insureds when the probable liability approached the policy limits.
Since an insurer's maximum obligation was the policy limit, insur-
ers would ignore settlement prospects and risk trial-in effect
gambling with the insured's money. 2 The insured's only recourse
was to allege negligence in the insurer's conduct of the trial.23 As.
one commentator has observed, "ITihe insurance industry enjoyed
almost total immunity. In the early part of the twentieth century
many courts took the position that the insurer was free to settle or
16. See infra notes 167-237 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 238-48 and accompanying text.
19. See, eg., Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923).
The court ruled that nothing in the policy obligated the insurer to settle a claim. The
insurer was "under no legal obligation, either express or implied, to compromise or settle
the claims prior to trial." Id. at 252, 140 N.E. at 579.
20. See, eg., Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 92 Me. 574,586,43
A. 503, 506 (1899).
21. The insured's damages were limited under the contract to the "amount due" (the
policy amount) plus interest. See Note, The Tort of Bad Faith:.4 Perspective Look at the
Insurer's Expanding Liability, 8 CuM. L. REv. 241, 242 (1977).
22. See Brittle, Avoiding Insurer's Excess Liability, 28 FED'N INS. CoUNs. Q. 298
(1978). "he essential implication was that the insurance company could write its own
contract and establish its own level of conduct." Id. at 301.
23. See Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 92 N.H. 140,26 A.2d 361 (1942),
where the court held that a cause of action for excess liability is a negligence action in
which the insured must show injury. The court would find no actual injury until the in-
sured had paid the excess judgment "or at least until his financial status is such that the
excess judgment is sure to be collected." Id. at 141, 26 A.2d at 362.
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not as it saw fit. The insurance company was only obliged to de-
fend and pay within the policy."
24
B. Modern View
Modem courts, with few exceptiohs,25 have rejected the nar-
row contractual approach. One writer has stated, "[A]n insurer's
absolute right to settle or not to settle a claim, which left the in-
sured completely at the mercy of the insurer, has been abandoned
in every jurisdiction that has ruled on the subject. 26
Insurance policies now are regarded as agreements whereby
the insurer promises to "stand in the shoes" of the insured in a loss
covered by the policy. 27 The insurer still controls the claim and
decides whether to settle or defend.28 Strong public policy consid-
erations support vesting this control in the insurer.
The obvious reason for the policy provision giving [a] company
such exclusive control over the settlement decision is to keep
down claims costs .... [There is a] fundamental premise that
the liability insurance system will work more effectively if [the]
company controls the defense and settlement than if either of
these matters is left to insured.29
Vesting such complete control in the insurer occasionally may sac-
rifice the insured's interests. 30 Thus, modem courts require that
this exclusive authority be exercised in good faith. From this man-
date springs the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
which courts now read into all insurance contracts.3 '
24. Miller, Living With Bad Faith, 46 INs. CouNs. J. 34, 34 (1979).
25. One of the few modem cases which still protects the insurer is Gordon v. Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d 849, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972). But see
Miller, supra note 24, at 35: "Gordon seems to be the last of its kind."
26. P. MAGARICK, ExcEss LIABILITY, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE IN-
SURER 139 (1976).
27. See Note, In California Excess Liability Cases, Does "Bad Faith" in Law Equal
"Strict Liability" in Practice?, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 115, 119 (1976).
28. Id. The basic decision process the insurer follows has not changed. If a lawsuit is
filed against the insured, the insurer must determine whether to settle the claim or defend
the insured. If the insurer decides to litigate and the insured is found liable, the insurer will
satisfy the claim up to the monetary limit of the insured's policy. The difference under the
modem approach is the ramifications of the insurer's decision to either settle or defend.
29. Keeton, supra note 1, at 1166.
30. For example, "[e]fforts to protect the solvency of the insurance fund for policy-
holders as a group might occasionally result in unfair treatment to an individual policy-
holder." Note, supra note 27, at 119.
31. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
[V/ol. 32:265
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C. Development of Case Law in the Insured-Insurer
Relationshp
Brassil v. Maryland Casualy Company 2 is an early example of
this good faith doctrine. The controversy arose when an insurer
failed to appeal an adverse judgment against its insured. The in-
sured successfully appealed and subsequently sued the insurer for
attorneys' fees and costs. Ironically, the insurance company first
claimed that the insured was not dealing "fairly and in good
faith.' '33 The court found, however, that the insurer had a "correl-
ative obligation" to exercise similar good faith.34
The development of the good faith and fair dealing doctrine is
characterized by confused terminologies and legal theories.: 5 An
action against an insurer has been characterized as sounding in
both contract and tort,3 6 and an insurer's violation of its good
faith duty is often called "bad faith." 37  One court defined bad
faith as "an intentional disregard of the financial interests of [the]
insured, in the hope of escaping full liability imposed.., by [the]
contract of insurance." 38 Another court adopted a less stringent
standard for imposing liability on the insurer: "[Flailure to con-
sider the interests of the insured, or the possibility of an excess
verdict, [is] to be considered as bad faith.",39 Thus, it appears that
while one court would impose liability for reckless, possibly even
32. 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914).
33. Id. at 242, 104 N.E. at 624.
34. Id.
35. The majority of courts will use a bad faith rationale to impose excess liability on
the insurer, a shorthand method of stating that a duty of good faith and fair dealing has
been violated. P. MAGARiCK, supra note 26, at 139. Courts have been especially prone to
confuse bad faith with negligence. For a definition of bad faith relying on negligence ter-
minology, see Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 325 F. Supp. 204, 206
(W.D.N.C. 1971). Other courts reach a middle ground, using negligence as a factor in
determining bad faith. See, eg, Tully v. Travelers Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 506, 571 (N.D.
Fla. 1954).
36. "Although wrongful refusal to settle has generally been treated as a tort ... it is
the rule that where a case sounds both in contract and tort the plaintiff will ordinarily have
freedom of election." Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 663, 328 P.2d
198, 203 (1958).
37. Due to the "elusive nature of the concepts of negligence and bad faith and their
many analytical similarities, the courts have shown a natural tendency to interchange the
principles and their theoretical bases. The result has been a coalescence of the standards
... combining a requirement of ordinary care in investigation with good faith in the deci-
sion not to settle... Brittle, su.pra note 22, at 304.
38. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wood, 277 F.2d 21, 34 (6th Cir. 1960) (em-
phasis added).
39. P. MAGARiCK, supra note 26, at 140 (citing Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Casualty
Co., 250 Iowa 1123, 97 N.W.2d 168 (1959).
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negligent, conduct by the insurer, another court would require a
showing of intentional conduct.
The landmark decision establishing the implied convenant of
good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts is Brown v.
Guarantee Insurance Co.' In Brown, the insurer refused to settle
because the claimant's demand approached the insured's policy
limit.4 1 The court found that "the relationship between the in-
sured and the insurer under such circumstances closely approxi-
mates that of principal and agent or beneficiary and trustee. 42
Thus, the court read an implied convenant into the contract that
neither party act in a manner which would injure the others'
rights.43
The insurer also may be subject to a bad faith claim for "un-
reasonably" refusing to accept a settlement offer within the in-
sured's policy limit.44 Courts apply divergent standards in
determining whether an insurer has violated its good faith duty by
refusing to settle. The prevailing standard requires the insurer to
give equal consideration to the insured's interests. 4
The interpretation of "equal consideration" has provoked sub-
stantial controversy.' One commentator stated that equal consid-
eration "with rare exceptions, does not require an insurer to give
more weight to the interests of an insured than it does to its own.
It requires only that the same degree of consideration be given to
the interests of both parties."' This interpretation of equal con-
sideration causes confusion, since either decision an insurer
makes-to settle or to litigate-sacrifices one party's interests.
Professor Keeton advocates the better view of identifying
equality of consideration with impartiality-as if the insurer were
one person holding two competing interests. 4  In a case which
adopted a variation of Keeton's standard, a California appellate
court stated, "[t]he fairest method of balancing the interests [of
40. 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
41. For a discussion of this type of conduct by the insured, see supra notes 19-24 and
accompanying text.
42. 155 Cal. App. 2d at 687, 319 P.2d at 74.
43. Id. at 684, 319 P.2d at 72-73. This principle was articulated in Brown v. Superior
Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 212 P.2d 878 (1949).
44. Note, supra note 21, at 242.
45. Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 140 (1958). See
Keeton,Ancillary Rights ofInsuredAgainst Liability Insurer, 13 VAND. L. REV. 827 (1960).
46. Brittle states that "the courts and commentators are far from agreement on what
weight should be given the insured's interest." Brittle, supra note 22, at 302.
47. P. MAGARICK, supra note 26, at 141.
48. R. KEnaON, BAsIc TExT ON INSURANCE LAW 511 (1971).
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both parties] is for the insurer to treat the claim as if it were alone
liable for the entire. amount. 49
Case law differs widely on this issue. Some courts hold that
the insured's interest must have equal consideration throughout
the settlement process." Other courts require equal consideration
until a conflict arises. When a conflict exists, the insurer is al-
lowed to subordinate the insured's interest.5 ' There also is a mi-
nority view requiring the insured's interest in avoiding personal
liability always to be preferred. 2 These varied interpretations of
equal consideration are prevalent in bad faith actions against the
insurer and produce inconsistent decisions.
1. Insurer's Duy to Settle
In applying the equal consideration test, it is unclear whether
an insurer may reasonably and in good faith refuse to accept a
settlement offer within the insured's policy limit. The problem is
created by the inherent conflict of interest which exists in the in-
sured-insurer relationship. This conflict is most apparent when
the insurer is negotiating a settlement. If liability exceeding the
policy limits is likely, the insurer usually will settle. Settlement
under such circumstances saves the insurer the costs of litigation
and avoids the possibility that the insured will be personally liable
for amounts exceeding the policy limits. 53 The normal remedy for
conflict of interest is separate counsel for both parties. 4 This solu-
tion is unworkable in the insurance context, however, since the
insured's counsel does not have settlement authority. The in-
sured's attorney only may offer advice to the insurer. 5
49. Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973). But
see Note, su ra note 27, at 131, where the author observes:
The court [in Merrit] considered the bad faith issue as it related to a conflict of
interest between the insurance company and the insured. The court determined
that as long as settlement within policy limits was not feasible the interests of the.
insured and the company were the same. It is to be noted that Merritt would not
be cited for the proposition that an insurer does not have a duty to promote settle-
ments. The facts of this case present a rare situation.
50. See, ag., Young v. American Casualty Co., 416 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1969), cer. ds-
missed, 396 U.S. 997 (1970).
51. See, ag., Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 A.
653 (1914).
52. See, eg., American Casualty Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951); Ameri-
can Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 289 U.S. 736 (1932).
53. See Brittle, supra note 22, at 300.
54. Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 519, 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 870
(1973).
55. One author comments facetiously that since "separate legal representation is inef-
fective in third-party excess liability actions, the courts have 'improvised' a workable solu-
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Choosing an appropriate course of action when the insurer be-
lieves its insured's potential liability will not exceed the policy
limit has created a dilemma. One commentator advocates the fol-
lowing view:
[M]ost courts hold ... that if an insurer honestly and reason-
ably believes, after proper investigation, that it can defeat an
action, or hold a judgment within the limits of its policy, its
refusal to settle for an amount within those limits cannot be
held to be bad faith, even though its decision may have been
mistaken.56
Later decisions, especially by California courts,57 reject the con-
tention that an insurer is never liable for a "good faith" mistaken
judgment.5" These later decisions hold that if an insurer refuses to
settle, then it will be liable for all damages which may be
awarded, including damages exceeding policy limits. The ineluc-
table conclusion reached by one commentator is that the "equita-
ble justification for applying this theory of recovery [the good
faith doctrine] to a refusal to settle is the unavailability of a realis-
tic alternative theory of recovery in a situation which cries out for
redress."59
2. Insurer's Duty to Defend
In addition to the duty to settle, an insurer has a duty to de-
fend its insured against third party claims. A traditional tort law
standard requiring the insurer to exercise ordinary care when de-
fending on behalf of the insured is applied in duty to defend
cases.60 This proposition has not been disputed widely. It is un-
clear, however, what consequences might flow from an insurer's
refusal to defend its insured.
This issue of an insurer's liability for refusing to defend its in-
tion: If the insurer rejects a settlement offer in bad faith, it will be held liable for the entire
judgment against the insured." Note, supra note 11, at 366-67.
56. P. MAGARiCK, supra note 26, at 141-42. See also Defenber & Townsend v. Amen-
can Universal Ins. Co., 372 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1967); Christian v. Preferred Accid. Ins. Co.,
89 F. Supp. 888 (N.D. Cal. 1950). These cases state that in the settlement context, insurers
are not expected to be "prophets" making correct judgments in every case.
57. "The California experience will, to the extent not prohibited by statute, spread to
other jurisdictions." Parks, supra note 12, at 59.
58. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
59. Parks, supra note 12, at 59. Brittle apparently has reached the same conclusion:
"What has become abundantly clear from the cases is that the critical consideration is not
the standard the court purportedly uses, but rather the equities involved in a particular fact
situation." Brittle, supra note 22, at 305.
60. Keeton, upra note 45, at 851.
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sured arose in Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co.61
where the insured, a truck driver, struck the Comunales at a cross-
walk. The insurance company refused to defend its insured, 2
claiming that its policy did not provide coverage since the insured
was not driving his own vehicle. 3 After trial, damages exceeding
the policy limit were assessed against the insured.64 By way of
settlement, the insured assigned his "refusal to defend" claim
against the insurance company to the Comunales. 65 In an attempt
to clarify past confusion regarding an insurer's duty to settle and
defend, the court asserted:
We do not agree with the cases that hold there is no liability
in excess of the policy limits where the insurer, believing there
is no coverage, wrongfully refuses to defend and without justifi-
cation refuses to settle the claim .... An insurer who denies
coverage does so at its own risk, and, although its position may
not have been entirely groundless, if the denial is found to be
wrongful ... [the insurer] is liable for the full amount .... 66
The court's attempt to forge a more workable standard of con-
duct67 for insurers has drawn heavy criticism. The Comunale de-
cision expands the insurer's implied duty of good faith to
instances where the insurer has "wrongfully" refused to defend its
insured or accept "reasonable" settlement offers. The ruling offers
little guidance for determining when an insurer's refusal to settle
or defend constitutes "wrongful" behavior." When contemplat-
ing settlement, the insurer at least must equate the insured's inter-
est with its own. 9 While Comunale closed the definitional gap
between negligence and bad faith, the court's definition of "rea-
sonableness" has "merely substituted one nebulous concept for
another."7 Since Comunale blurs the distinction between negli-
gence--or even mistaken judgment, i.e., innocence-and bad
faith, there are few situations where an insurer can negligently re-
61. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
62. Id. at 657, 328 P.2d at 200.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 658, 328 P.2d at 200.
66. Id. at 660, 328 P.2d at 201-02.
67. See Brittle, supra note 22, at 304.
68. "Mhis case discusses good faith in terms of the 'most reasonable manner of dis-
posing of the claim.' It also contains language suggesting that the insurer may be liable on
a straight breach of contract theory, rendering the reasonableness of the company's actions
irrelevant." Id. at 305 (quoting Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at 659, 328 P.2d at 201).
69. 50 Cal. 2d at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
70. Note, 4pplying the BadFaith Doctrine to the Primary and Excess Insurance Carrier
Relationshio in California, 7 Loy. L.A. L.REv. 277, 284 (1974).
1981]
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fuse to settle or defend without being held liable under a bad faith
rationale.7" Thus, Comunale establishes that no insurer may es-
cape its duty of good faith and fair dealing by claiming that its
insured is not covered under the policy.7 2 Such a claim invites a
judgment of bad faith.
In the wake of Comunale, commentators accused California
courts of reordering the economics of the insurance industry,
making it nearly impossible for insurers to exercise business judg-
ment-whether in good faith or not. It has been observed:
[The court] tempered the inherent conflict between the insurer's
economic interests and those of the assured by relegating to the
insurer the arduous task of preassessing the reasonableness of
its treatment of the assured. Misassessment could expose the
insurer to liability for the entire adverse judgment, even for
amounts exceeding the policy limits.
73
This criticism reflects a misunderstanding of the role of insurance
in society. The key issue is whether insureds will benefit collec-
tively from judicial imposition of a more rigorous duty on the in-
surer in settlements. The insurance industry probably would raise
premiums to meet an increased number of claims alleging bad
faith. The pivotal issue is whether the increased protection for all
insureds is worth the increase in premiums.74
Critics also claim that Comunale and similar decisions essen-
tially are imposing strict liability on insurance companies for fail-
ure to settle or defend on behalf of insureds.75 While California
has not explicitly adopted strict liability, the tables have been
turned against insurers. Instead of gambling with an insured's
money, the insurer now must gamble with its own funds when
refusing to defend an action or settle a claim which probably will
result in an excess judgment.
71. Id. at 281.
72. "The implied duty of good faith does not gain its existence from the insurer's right
to control the litigation, but is inherent in every contract so long as that contract remains in
existence." Note, supra note 21, at 247.
73. Note, supra note 70, at 284.
74. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Kircher, Insurer's Mitaken Judgement-A New Tort?, 59 MARQ. L. REv.
775 (1976). "What the California Courts are telling insurers operating in the state is that
they will be absolutely liable for insureds' consequential damages if an honest mistake in
judgment results in the failure to pay a claim, which, upon hindsight, should have been
paid." Id. at 785.
Some recent cases have ignored the California view. See, eg., LaRocca v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1971), aft'dment, 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir.
1973); Colsh v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 N.E.2d 593 (Mass. 1972).
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3. Defense Against a Bad Faith Claim
Defense options available to an insurer accused of bad faith
are limited severely. Juries have not been overly sympathetic to-
wards the insurers' perspective. 6 California courts, building on
the Comunale decision,77 have taken the lead in circumscribing
insurers' defense strategies. In Johansen v. Caifornia State Auto-
mobile Association,78 an insurer's good faith belief in its insured's
noncoverage was rejected as a valid defense. The court stated that
"an insurer's 'good faith,' though erroneous, belief in noncoverage
affords no defense to liability flowing from the insurer's refusal to
accept a reasonable settlement offer." 79 Thus, under Johansen, an
insurer may entertain a good faith belief in noncoverage, but the
insurer assumes the risk that its belief is correct.
An insurer which decides to assert noncoverage of its insured
under an insurance policy faces a substantial liability risk if it is
determined subsequently that coverage was appropriate. To
avoid a potential bad faith claim, the court in Johansen suggested
that the insurer enter into an agreement with its insured whereby
the insurer would reserve the right to assert a noncoverage de-
fense. The insurer then would settle the case to protect the in-
sured. 0 If the insurer later proves noncoverage, it then may seek
reimbursement of the settlement payment from its insured.'
While the court's solution is perhaps theoretically feasible, "it is
questionable as to how many 'insureds' will possess sufficient as-
sets to satisfy claims for reimbursement." 2 Furthermore, the
court's solution to the noncoverage dilemma is contrary to notions
of judicial economy, since another court action between the in-
sured and its insurer would be necessary. 3
76. One of the few cases holding for the insurer is Hodges v. Standard Accident Ins.
Co., 198 Cal. App. 2d 564, 18 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1961). The court found that the insurer's
failure to keep the insured informed of settlement offers did not indicate bad faith without
further evidence of an overt conflict of interest between the insurer and its insured. This
case is regarded as an historical curiosity in California's development of the good faith
duty. Note, Excess Liabiliy: Reconsideration of Calfornia3 Bad Faith Negligence Rule, 18
STAN. L. REv. 475, 479 (1966).
77. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
78. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975).
79. Id. at 15, 538 P.2d at 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
80. Id. at 19, 538 P.2d at 750, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
81. Id.
82. Note, supra note 22, at 129.
83. One author maintains that, even without the Johansen court proposal, the way an
insured must enforce his or her rights is both cumbersome and time consuming: "Contrary
to the general policy favoring judicial economy, current law tends to foster multitudinous
1981]
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The Johansen decision mandates that the insurer's business
judgment be exercised in its insured's best interest. The result of
the court's decision is that now "the only permissible considera-
tion in evaluating the reasonableness of the settlement offer be-
comes whether, in light of the victim's injuries and the probable
liability of the insured, the ultimate judgment is likely to exceed
the amount of the settlement offer."84 This standard arguably
weakens the insurer's right to control the handling of a claim
made against its insured. While the right to control claims is a
major premise on which the insurance industry was founded, it
must be remembered that the insurer's exclusive control over
claims is tempered by the duty to exercise that control in the in-
sured's best interest.85
In response to judicial decisions limiting an insurer's defense
options, there have been numerous proposals attempting to bal-
ance the interests of both the insured and the insurer. One sugges-
tion is that the insurance industry consider adopting a uniform
claims analysis system. 86 Another suggestion, which recognizes
the limited possibility of an insurer successfully appealing an ex-
cess liability judgment because of juries' bias against insurance
companies,87 is to remove the bad faith determination from the
jury's province.8 1A third proposal, aimed at avoiding possible col-
lusion between the insured and the injured third party, would pro-
hibit the insured from assigning the bad faith cause of action.8 9
Finally, a proposal examined at length below advocates imposing
strict liability on the insurer in its relationship with the insured.90
litigation by requiring a second suit in which the insured or an assignee attempts to prove
the insurer's bad faith or negligence." Brittle, supra note 22, at 307.
84. Note, supra note 27, at 129.
85. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
86. See Parks & Neil, Insurers Beware: "Bad Faith is in Full Bloom," 9 FORUM 63
(1973). "It is suggested that what the insurance industry needs, in order to support the
reasonableness of a decision to deny benefits, are standardized, industry accepted proce-
dures which should be followed in the processing of various types of claims." Id. at 68.
87. Note, supra note 76, at 480. "An insurance company doing business in California,
in evaluating its chances of upsetting an adverse excess liability judgment on appeal, can
only conclude that its chances are minimal."
88. Id. at 481. See also Note, California- In Search of a Solutionfor Excess Liabilily
Problems, 8 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 97, 106 (1967).
89. Note, supra note 76, at 481. Although prohibiting assignability may deprive the
insured of a possible method of satisfying an injured party's claim, assignability in the
insurance context has been condemned as illogical and unjust. "A doctrine or statute per-
mitting claimant to recover the excess from the company is only slightly beneficial to the
insured-the one who is the victim of company's wrong." Keeton, supra note 1, at 1176-77.
90. See infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 32:265
PRMA4RY A ND EXCESS INSURERS
4. Movement Toward Strict Liabiliy
In Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.91 the movement toward
strict liability for refusing to settle or defend an insured acceler-
ated. The court held that an insured's recovery on a bad faith
claim "may be based on unwarranted rejection of a reasonable
settlement offer and that the absence of evidence, circumstantial
or direct, showing actual dishonesty, fraud, or concealment [by the
insurer] is not fatal to the cause of action." 92
Several policy considerations weighed heavily in the decision.
The court assumed that whenever excess liability is possible, the
insured's interest dictates settlement.93 The court also believed
that since an insured purchases a policy for protection, the insured
reasonably may expect that a sum equal to the policy limits be
available for settlement. 94 The court concluded:
[T]here is more than a small amount of elementary justice in a
rule that would require that, in this situation where the in-
surer's and the insured's interests necessarily conflict, the in-
surer, which may reap the benefits of its determination not to
settle, should also suffer the detriments of its decision.95
While the court proposed a strict liability rule, its holding was
predicated on a bad faith refusal to settle, thus precluding the im-
position of strict liability.96 The court's dicta, advocating strict lia-
bility, has caused much debate about the decision's true impact.
Some commentators suggest that Crislci is an example of the extent
to which a court may go to protect the insured.9 7 Others view the
case as establishing a definitive standard for insurers in settlement
91. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). In Crisci, the plaintiffs
tenant (third party claimant) fell through a staircase in plaintiffs apartment house. Plaintiff
had a $10,000 liability policy with defendant insurance company. Id. at 427, 426 P.2d at
175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15. Defendant rejected tenant's settlement offer of $9,000, even with
the knowledge that should the jury believe tenant's claim of mental suffering, the verdict
would approach $100,000. Id. The insured satisfied the adverse verdict which exceeded the
policy limits by assigning her cause of action against the insurer to the tenant. Id. at 428,
426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
92. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
93. Id.
94. The court stated that the proposed rule would eliminate the chance that "an in-
surer, faced with a settlement offer at or near the policy limits, will reject it and gamble
with the insured's money to further its own interests." Id.
95. Id.
96. The Crisci court "proposed a strict liability rule but found a bad faith refusal to
settle and, thus, did not impose strict liability." Note, supra note 11, at 373.
97. "While Crisci by no means represents the typical case, it does indicate the poten-
tial exposure that the insurance carrier must consider." Brittle, supra note 22, at 306.
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cases.
98
The Crisci test has been accepted generally as the standard of
conduct an insurer should follow in deciding whether to settle
claims against its insured.99 Under the Crisci test, the following
standard will be applied to evaluate an insurer's conduct of the
settlement: "[Whether a prudent insurer without policy limits
would have accepted the settlement offer."'1° Thus, for the in-
surer to protect itself from bad faith claims, the contractual limits
of its agreement with the insured must be ignored when evaluat-
ing settlement offers. The insurer must accept a settlement offer if
it is likely that a court will award damages exceeding the insured's
policy limits.10 1 Crisci, therefore, supports the view that while the
courts have yet to declare strict liability in law, strict liability in
fact now prevails. 102
Imposition of strict liability for an insurer's misjudgment in
the settlement process is favored by most commentators. 10 3 Those
favoring strict liability argue that it will encourage settlements, re-
duce court congestion, protect the consumer from the risk of per-
sonal liability, and deter the abuse of fiduciary responsibilities by
insurers. 104 More practically, proponents endorse strict liability as
bringing order to chaos: "A predictable standard will stabilize an
98. See, e.g., Note, supra note 21, at 248, where the author remarks: "Crisci, there-
fore, appears to finally settle the confusion as to whether the cause of action for failure to
settle is based upon a theory of contract or tort-it is based upon both."
99. See Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 N.J. 62, 237 A.2d 857 (1968), where the
court stated:
The interests of both the insurer and insured can be served justly only if the in-
surer treats any settlement offer as if it had full coverage for whatever verdict
might be recovered, regardless of policy limits, and makes its decision to settle or
to go to trial on that basis. That rule, which we deem to be the appropriate one,
has been applied in other jurisdictions in such cases.
Id. at 71-72. 238 A.2d at 862. See also Keppic v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 210 N.W.2d 844, 848
(Iowa 1973): "Modern decisions require the insurer (in the exercise of good faith) to view
the settlement situation as if there were no policy limit applicable to the claim. When it
does so, it views the claim objectively and renders equal consideration to the interests of
itef and the insured"; Crabb v. National Indem. Co., 87 S.D. 222, 205 N.W.2d 633 (1973).
100. Crisei, 66 Cal. 2d at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
101. The unanswered question may be unanswerable. When does an insurer's good
faith decision to litigate become a bad faith decision not to settle? One commentator views
the situation this way: "In effect, the [Crisetl Court was saying to the insurance company:
you were seeking to save your money, not the insured's money. The insured bought the
protection of your policy and the peace of mind that comes with the protection of your
policy, and you failed. You took the gamble but the insured lost." Miller, supra note 24, at
35.
102. Note, supra note 27, at 121.
103. See infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
104. Brittle, supra note 22, at 308.
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area of the law now plagued with capricious results under the
amorphous good faith-reasonableness test."105
Advocates of strict liability cite furtherance of public policy
and consumer protection as major attributes of the rule. En-
hanced consumer protection is justified because the insurer con-
trols the decisionmaking process and is "more skilled in
evaluating liability and distributing the risk of loss, [such that it]
should not be permitted to shift the hazard of its decision to the
insured."106 Strict liability also would provide insureds with bet-
ter protection since it would reduce the occurrence of multiple ac-
tions over a single claim by encouraging insurers to settle before
trial. Although policy premiums may increase as more claims are
settled, spreading the cost of better protection is consistent with
the public policy favoring risk distribution. 107
Advocates of strict liability also contend it will benefit the in-
surance industry:
It is possible that the insurance industry would save money if a
rule of strict liability were imposed. If the insurer settled, it
would save the cost of defense and extensive investigation. If it
chose to litigate, and suffered an excess judgment, it would pay
and save the expense of defending an excess liability action. 08
Proponents of strict liability also deny that the rule would force
unwilling insurance carriers to settle. The insurer has the skill and
experience to determine when a verdict will be in the insured's
favor, and its judgment is usually correct.10 9 Thus, the insurer still
may rely on its judgment without being compelled to settle un-
105. Kelly, The Workable Sanction and Solution in Excess Liability Cases: Strict Liabil-
ity/or Insurance Carriers, 1976 INs. L.J. 346, 355. See also Note, supra note 88, at 106
(primary advantage of applying strict liability is that it is "consistent, predictable method of
determining liability").
106. Note, supra note 11, at 380.
107. Id.
108. Note, supra note 76, at 485. See also Kelly, supra note 105, at 355. The author
asserts that "the insurance industry can distribute the cost, if any, of the strict liability rule
over a vast segment of the populace." He further states:
It is also questionable whether a strict liability rule will result in any additional
cost to the insurance industry. It must be remembered that any extra cost will be
diluted by the savings in defense and investigation costs that will result where an
offer made within the policy limit is accepted. In addition, costs of defense in a
second action will be saved.
109. This argument illustrates the disagreement between proponents of strict liability
and the insurance industry. The argument that the insurer is "usually correct" in its judg-
ment of how to handle an insured's claim fails to recognize that imposing liability in the
comparatively few cases in which the insurer's judgment is mistaken may have a dramatic
impact on both the insurance industry and the consumer. See infra notes 112-15 and ac-
companying text.
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wisely. 10 One commentator, convinced of the benefits of strict
liability, recommends that insurers take the initiative and offer
their insureds a strict liability clause in the policy." 1
Opponents of strict liability, however, maintain that the con-
cept is inappropriate in the insurance context. These individuals
argue that since the insurance industry is premised on an insurer's
exclusive control of claims, strict liability effectively would divest
the insurer of that control. This loss of control then would cause a
diminution of the claim fund."1 2 Opponents predict that strict lia-
bility also would increase fraudulent claims, force unwise settle-
ments, and raise consumer premiums. 3
A typical objection is that "It]he company shouldn't be forced
to settle claims it believes are fraudulent. . . . The costs of insur-
ance would probably go up because the company would bear es-
sentially the same risk regardless of the size of the policy it sold;
the limitations imposed by the contract would be rendered virtu-
ally meaningless." I 4 Critics of strict liability condemn this "after-
the-fact" Crisci-type analysis, which does not require a showing of
fault on the insurer's part." 5
As noted above, while strict liability has yet to be officially
adopted by the courts, the rule now prevails in fact." 6 The pres-
ent trend for courts following California's lead is to operate under
strict liability precepts while avoiding explicit acknowledgment
that the rule is being applied." 7
5. One Step Further-Insurer's Affirmative Duty
The insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing was extended
in Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Insurance Co. of
110. Kelly, supra note 105, at 354.
111. "The present judicial rule requiring bad faith... seems thoroughly entrenched.
Therefore, insurance companies should consider offering to the public, at least, as an alter-
native to present policy provisions, a clause agreeing to strict liability; or the legislature
should consider making the offer of such a clause mandatory." Note, supra note 76, at 485.
112. "When the court says that [strict liability] would not place a greater burden upon
insurers, it speaks from either vast ignorance or worse. Under this kind of rule, the insurer
could be at the mercy of every attorney who made a demand within the policy limits, no
matter how exorbitant or ridiculous." P. MAGARICK, supra note 26, at 203.
113. Note, supra note 11, at 378.
114. Brittle, supra note 22, at 308-09.
115. See, e.g., Hills, Development and Direction of the California Bad Faith Insurance
Doctrine or "0 Ye of Little Faith," 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 29, 52 (1974).
116. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
117. "[A]U recent bad faith cases have used an 'after-the-fact' approach in imposing
liability on the insurer. This judicial approach is at least an analogue to strict liability
which, of course, is not necessarily absolute liability." Hills, supra note 115, at 52.
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America,"" which held that an insurer has a positive fiduciary
duty to initiate settlement negotiations. The court stated that an
insurer may not simply accept reasonable settlement offers when
proferred. 19 The insurer's only permissible defense to liability
imposed by Rova Farms is to demonstrate that settlement was vir-
tually impossible. Furthermore, if settlement above policy limits
were possible, the insurer must establish that the insured refused
to contribute the excess amount to the settlment. 2 ° The court
claimed, however, that its decision did not eliminate insured's
burden of proving bad faith.12 ' Although this requirement may
not be eliminated expressly, the imposition of an affirmative
fiduciary duty on the insurer to elicit settlement offers actively les-
sens the insured's burden in an action against his or her insurer.
22
Rova Farms illustrates the difficulty in applying the good faith
and equal consideration doctrines. If the insured-insurer relation-
ship necessarily involves conflicting interests, it seems incongru-
ous to require the insurer to balance the insured's best interest
against its own. This balancing, however, is exactly what the
courts require the insurer to do.'2" The requirement may be un-
derstood better if the insurer is viewed as a being in a fiduciary
relationship with its insured. Thus, the insurer would be expected
to equate the insured's interest with its own interest.
The case law development concerning the duty of an insurer to
its insured has prompted the creation of specific duties which an
insurer owes its insured. Among these are the insurer's duty to
defend 24 and to settle. 25 The cases, however, have failed to es-
tablish a definitive legal standard by which the insurer's perform-
ance of its duties may be assessed. An insurer clearly may no
longer claim a good faith belief in its insured's noncoverage as a
defense against a bad faith claim for its refusal to defend or set-
118. 65 NJ. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
119. The court stated that "an insurer, having contractually restricted the independent
negotiating power of its insured, has a positive fiduciary duty to take the initiative and
attempt to negotiate a settlement within the policy coverage." Id. at 496, 323 A.2d at 507.
120. Id.
121. Miller, supra note 24, at 40.
122. See Note, supra note 27, at 129.
123. In most legal relationships determination of the merits of conflicting interests
by one of the parties to the conflict is forbidden... . [Yet the insurance] carrier
who receives an offer to settle an excess claim within the policy limits is instructed
to weigh its own interest on the scales along with those of its assured in order to
make a good faith determination whether to accept or reject the offer.
Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 499, 323 A.2d at 509.
124. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
1981]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tle.' 26 This prohibition does not solve the problem of an insurer's
potential liability for bad faith solely arising from the insurer's
method of handling a claim against its insured. California and
other jurisdictions seem to have solved the problem by evaluating
the insurer's conduct under strict liability standards. 27 The strict
liability analysis now applied simply means that an insurer will be
liable for failure to settle a claim against its insured where hind-
sight indicates settlement was reasonably possible. This determi-
nation is made without regard to the insurer's motive in deciding
not to settle. 12
8
Proponents of this standard view it as an effective prod to in-
duce insurers to consider their insureds' best interests. 129 The con-
fusion arises when courts affix a "bad faith" label to the insurer's
decision in the settlement process. This label redefines "bad
faith" so as to include actions which the insurer honestly, though
mistakenly, believed to be in the insured's best interest. Critics of
the quasi-strict liability rule believe it will have a debilitating ef-
fect on the insurance industry.130 Some of this criticism and un-
certainty might be dispelled if courts would cease to cloud their
decisions with murky and inappropriate "bad faith" labels.
II. DUTY OF INSURED TO INSURER
A. Duty to Cooperate
An insured also has certain correlative obligations and duties
to its insurer. The insured, for instance, owes a general duty of
cooperation to its insurer. This obligation may be written into the
policy,' 3 ' or a court may infer the duty from the relationship of
the parties. 32 The extent to which the duty of cooperation is ex-
panded by an insured's arguable duty of good faith dealing with
his or her insurer is not yet clear. It has been established, how-
126. See supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
131. In a typical liability policy, the cooperation clause would read: "The insured shall
cooperate with the company and, upon the company's request, shall attend hearings and
trials and shall assist in effecting settlements, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the
attendance of witnesses and in the conduct of suits." Keeton, supra note 1, at 1154 n.45.
132. Professor Keeton refers to the insured's duty of cooperation as arising from the
parties' relationship. "In this respect it is analogous to the insurer's duty of good faith in
relation to settlement, as to which, it is generally argued, the insurance contract is silent."
Keeton, supra note 45, at 847.
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ever, that a breach of a cooperation clause relieves the insurer of
liability for failure to settle within the policy limits. 133 Further-
more, there are a few other specific situations in which the insurer
has been relieved of liability for its decision not to settle. These
situations include: if the insurer's decision is influenced by the
insured's misrepresentation or wrongful actions; 134 if there is
strong evidence of collusion between the insured and claimant
designed to force the insurer to settle;135 or if the insured refuses to
disclose facts pertinent to the insurer's decision to settle or
defend. 136
B. Reciprocal Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Aside from specific obligations outlined in the insurance con-
tract, the extent of an insured's duty to his or her insurer remains
unclear. The issue is whether the insured owes a duty to his or her
insurer which is essentially the reciprocal of the duty the insurer
owes its insured. If a reciprocal duty is not imposed, it is neces-
sary to determine whether the insured has a lesser obligation to
the insurer. 137
One of the few cases to consider this issue is Transit Casualty
Co. v. Spink Corp. 31 Transit, an excess insurer,139 sued both its
policyholder, Spink, and Spink's primary insurance carrier for
their refusal to settle death and injury claims resulting from a con-
struction site accident. Although Spink's policy had a "settlement
clause" which allowed the insured to reject proposed settlements,
the court found sufficient evidence to uphold a jury determination
that Spink had violated its "duty of reasonable settlement" and
that the violation was the proximate cause of Transit's loss. 14
Transit is significant in suggesting that an insured may be lia-
ble for unreasonable refusal to settle.' 4 1 The court also suggested
133. P. MAGARICK, supra note 26, at 191.
134. See Stevens v. Northwestern Nat'1 Casualty Co., 305 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1962).
135. See State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1939).
136. See Hall v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 204 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1953).
137. The implication of the creation of an insured's good faith duty to his or her insurer
might mean that the insured would be required to put the insurer's financial interests on
the same level as his or her own interests. Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 919, 610 P.2d 1038, 1042, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 (1980).
138. 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1979).
139. See infra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
140. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 138, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
141. See Lanzone, Dulles Owed by a Primary Insurer and an Insured with a Self-Insured
Retention to an Excess Insurer-4n Update, 28 FED'N INS. Cous. Q. 267 (1978). "This
case is significant because it suggests that the insured may be held liable for the amount of
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that when the insured has a large self-insured retention," a recip-
rocal duty to settle may exist when dealing with a primary or ex-
cess insurer. 1
4 3
In analyzing the duty of an insured with a self-insured reten-
tion to contribute to reasonable settlements, an analogy may be
drawn between the insured with a self-insured retention and an
insured with a deductible feature in his or her policy. It has been
shown that a standard of good faith and fair dealing imposed on
the insurer demands a correlative, though not fully reciprocal,
duty on the insured. 144 The good faith duty of an insured with a
deductible includes a duty to be reasonably cooperative with the
insurer in the settlement process. Application of this implied duty
to cooperate leads to the conclusion that "an insured must have an
obligation to tender the full amount of its deductible towards a
reasonable settlement negotiated by the carrier." 14  In appropri-
ate circumstances, a court may find that an insured's failure to
tender a deductible constitutes a breach of the insured's duty to
the insurer. 146 By analogy, it may be argued that an insured who
is self-insured must also tender an amount equal to the self-in-
sured limit to the insurer negotiating a reasonable settlement. 47
It must be noted, however, that self-insurance differs from a
deductible on a liability policy in one important respect--the in-
sured with a deductible does not establish a claim fund to meet
a judgment when it arbitrarily, selfishly or improperly refuses to consent to what would
otherwise be an appropriate settlement." Id. at 277.
142. Self-insurance specifically means that the insured establishes its own fund from
which recurring liability judgments may be satisfied:
If one is engaged in a sufficient volume of ventures of a given type, he can spread
the risks of individual ventures among all the ventures in the group, paying losses
from a fund created by charging a proportionate part of the total predicted cost
against each venture without reference to which ones in fact produce harm. He is
thus engaging in planned risk retention.
R. KEETON, supra note 48, at 7.
143. Lanzone, supra note 141, at 277. Insureds who are self-insured must "now be
aware that their obligations to the excess insurer may be similar to a primary insurer's
duties to an excess insurer." Id.
144. See Kurland & Simon, The Insured's Duty to Tender a Deductible in Settlement,
1980 INS. CouNs. J. 552. "Beyond this reciprocal obligation of good faith and fair dealing,
an insurer also has an implied right to insist upon the reasonable cooperation of the in-
sured." Id. at 553.
145. Id.
146. Id. See also Riley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1372, 1377 n.6 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970).
147. See Kurland & Simon, supra note 144, at 554. This principle also applies to an
insured with a deductible or a self-insured portion. When an insurer negotiates a reason-
able settlement and the insured fails to tender its deductible, then the insured is gambling
capriciously at the insurer's expense for a verdict less than the deductible amount.
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the adverse eventualities. The insured with a deductible merely
chooses to assume a risk level which is uninsured. The analogy,
therefore, between these two types of insureds must be limited in
scope.
The imposition of some limited duty on insureds to accept rea-
sonable settlements may be predicated on the public policy goal
favoring settlement of lawsuits.' 4  Furthermore, the movement
toward self-insurance might be slowed if an insured could refuse
to contribute to settlements without fear of legal sanction. 14 9 This
trend could destroy an insurer's incentive to issue policies to pro-
vide umbrella coverage for self-insured risk retention. Insulating
an insured from liability for refusing to contribute to settlements
also might force insurers to increase premiums to compensate for
the insured's missing contribution. 50
California courts, as forerunners in developing the good faith
concept as applied to insurers, are reluctant to fashion a limited
version of this same duty to apply to insureds. In Commercial
Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,' Commercial
Union, an excess insurer, claimed that Safeway owed it a duty to
accept settlement offers below the amount of excess coverage
when it was likely that a liability judgment above the primary
coverage would occur.152 The court rejected this argument and
made the following observation:
This theory, while possessing superficial plausibility and exqui-
site simplicity, cannot withstand closer analysis. [The duty of
good faith and fair dealing] is dependent upon the nature of the
bargain struck between the insurer and the insured and the le-
gitimate expectations of the parties which arise from the
contract. 153
148. Id. at 556.
149. The self-insurance discussion is important in light of the California Supreme
Court's holding in Commercial Union which repudiates Spink. See infira notes 151-57 and
accompanying text.
150. Kurland & Simon, supra note 144, at 557. The authors predict that it is likely that
premiums will be adjusted to reflect this trend, and carriers might not write policies with
high deductibles. "This could limit the trend to greater self-insurance and the consequent-
ial diminution of losses engendered by the direct responsibility of an insured for its losses."
Id.
151. 26 Cal. 3d 912, 610 P.2d 1038, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980). Commercial Union, an
excess liability carrier, brought an action against its insured (Safeway) and Safeway's pri-
mary insurance carrier (Travelers). Commercial Union claimed that both Safeway and
Travelers violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by not settling the
case below excess liability coverage. Id. at 915-16, 610 P.2d at 1040, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
152. Id. at 918, 610 P.2d at 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
153. Id.
19811
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Thus, the same court which held in Comunale v. Traders &
General Insurance Co.154 that an insurance company must equate
the insured's interest with its own, refused to impose a similar
standard on the insured in Commercial Union.155 The court be-
lieved that the purpose of excess insurance was to allow the in-
sured to gamble, and the protection of the insurer's pecuniary
interest was not part of the bargain. 5 6 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court dismissed any contrary implications that might
have been expressed in Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp 1 57
The holding in Commercial Union is consistent with California
precedent in that it favors the insured. To protect the insured,
however, the court reverted to the strict contract language which
early twentieth century courts utilized to shield the insurance in-
dustry from liability. 5 The duty of good faith originally devel-
oped to prevent the insurer from gambling with the insured's
money during settlement.'59 Commercial Union, however, indi-
cates, at least in the excess insurance context, that gambling with
the insurer's money is permissible.' 60 This criticism does not sug-
gest that the insured should owe its insurer a fiduciary duty. Nev-
ertheless, to allow an insured unreasonably to ignore settlement
prospects is contrary to the theory and spirit of the good faith
doctrine. 16 1
While the insured may not owe its insurer a reciprocal good
154. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958). For a discussion of Comunale, see supra notes
61-75 and accompanying text.
155. The court found no duty which required the insured to put the insurer's financial
interests on at least an equal plane with its own. "Such a duty cannot reasonably be found
... in the absence of express language in the contract so providing." 26 Cal. 3d at 921,610
P.2d at 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 714. The court acknowledged that equity mandated fair
dealing between the parties to an insurance contract. The court, however, rejected the
conclusion that the insured's "covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be extended
to include a 'Comunale duty'--that is, a duty which would require an insured contemplat-
ing settlement to put the excess carrier's financial interests on at least an equal footing with
its own." Id., 610 P.2d at 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 714. While this Note does not suggest that
the insured owes afduciary duly to his or her insurer, issue is taken with the court's reason-
ing. See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
156. "The insured owes no duty to defend or indemnify the excess carrier; hence the
carrier can possess no reasonable expectation that the insured will accept a settlement offer
as a means of'protecting' the carrier from exposure." 26 Cal. 3d at 919, 610 P.2d at 1041-
42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13.
157. Id. at 921, 610 P.2d at 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 714. See supra notes 13841 and
accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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faith duty, the insured clearly owes his or her insurer at least a
duty of cooperation.'62 To date, courts have limited an insured's
liability under a duty of cooperation clause to unconscionable
acts.1 63 In light of the extensive developmeiit of the insurer's duty
of good faith and fair dealing, the major controversy over the ex-
tent of the insured's duty to his or her insurer is whether the duty
of good faith should be fully reciprocal. Those who argue affirm-
atively claim that requiring the insured to exercise good faith en-
hances the public policy favoring out-of-court dispute
settlement."e California, however, has rejected imposition of full
reciprocity of the good faith duty of the insured to his or her in-
surer-at least in the excess insurance context. The California
Supreme Court maintains that such a duty, unless explicitly
agreed to, is not within the legitimate expectations of the parties to
an insurance agreement.165 The implication of this view, espe-
cially in the case involving an insured with a self-insured risk re-
tention,' 66 is that an insured may have great latitude in refusing to
settle without violating his or her obligation to the insurer.
III. THE PRIMARY-EXCESS INSURER RELATIONSHIP: How Is
IT INFLUENCED BY THE INSURED-INSURER
RELATIONSHIP?
To obtain adequate protection against high damage awards by
juries, an insured may purchase more than one insurance pol-
icy.167 The mechanism through which this extended protection is
accomplished is excess insurance. While each insurer owes a duty
to the individual insured through the contractual privity which an
insurance policy creates,' 68 complications arise in attempting to
delineate the rights and obligations between primary and excess
insurers.
The primary-excess insurance relationship is formed most fre-
quently by the insured purchasing two separate rate policies-one
providing primary and the other providing excess coverage.' 69
162. An insured must not necessarily accept a settlement merely to avoid exposing the
excess insurer to liability. See Wall, Bad Faith, Excess Liabiliy Actions By or Against Ex-
cess Insurers, INs. CouNs. .. 311, 324 (1981).
163. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 151-61 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
167. Keeton, supra note 45, at 841.
168. Note, supra note 70, at 291.
169. Id.
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This purchase does not form a contractual relationship between
the primary and excess carriers; rather, it serves to link them to the
common insured.17 0 The primary insurer generally is responsible
for defending the insured, negotiating settlements, and indemnify-
ing the insured up to his or her primary policy limits. 7 ' The ex-
cess insurer's role is to protect the insured by providing coverage
when the limits of the primary insurance policy are exceeded: "In
effect, the excess carrier provides 'umbrella' coverage against the
larger losses that the assured may suffer."' 72
Given the extensive development of the insured-insurer rela-
tionship, the question arises whether primary or excess insurers
may benefit against the other by claiming the application of a doc-
trine analogous to the good faith duty an insurer owes its insured.
Courts have held, on varied theoretical grounds, that this doctrine
inures to the excess insurer's benefit. Professor Keeton has ob-
served, "This result may be supported either on the theory of sub-
rogation of the excess insurer to the rights of insured against the
primary insurer, or upon the theory that the primary insurer owes
to the excess insurer the same duty that it owes to the insured." "3
Before examining the merits of either theory, it is necessary to
examine the working relationship of the primary and excess insur-
ers regarding their common insured, the rights and obligations of
the respective insurers, and the role of the aforementioned alter-
native legal theories in shaping this relationship.
A. Rights and Duties as Between Two Insurers
As a general rule, 1' 4 it is the primary insurer's obligation to
handle the defense. '7 This obligation exists because it is the pri-
mary insurer that has the best facilities to investigate and handle
170. Id. at 292.
171. See Knepper, Relationship Between Primary and Excess Carriers in Cases Where
Judgment or Settlement Value Will Exhaust the Primary Coverage, 20 INS. CouNs. J. 207,
208 (1953).
172. Note, supra note 70, at 292.
173. Keeton, supqra note 1, at 1152.
174. Although no case may be found which holds that the excess carrier has the
sole duty of defense, there is so much disagreement among the courts as to the
proper allocation of the burden of defense between primary and excess carriers
... that support may be found for almost any other position a carrier would
want to take on this issue.
German & Gallagher, Allocation of the Duties ofDefense Between Carriers Providing Cover-
age to the Same Insured, 47 INS. CouNs. J. 224, 228 (1980).
175. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862,
865 (1976).
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claims. 76 Furthermore, the primary insurer's rate structure is
designed to include defense Costs. 177 The matter is complicated,
however, because some excess insurers operate under policies
which contractually obligate them to defend the insured. Other
excess insurers have no specific obligation to defend until the pri-
mary insurer's policy limits are exceeded.1 78 For an excess insurer
in the former category, its rights and duties are fairly clear. The
excess insurer has a duty to defend when its policy limits are in-
volved.179 Should the primary insurer wrongfully refuse to de-
fend, the excess carrier assumes the defense and may recover from
primary insurer the amount of any judgment which is within the
limits of the primary coverage.180 If the primary and excess insur-
ers have a contractual duty to cooperate in the defense, defense
costs generally are prorated among the insurers.18',
Courts have held that excess insurers with no contractual obli-
gation to defend are not obligated to reimburse the primary in-
surer for any part of the defense costs where the judgment is
within the primary insurer's policy limits.' 82 Other decisions,
however, have held that "all other factors being equal, there is at
least an equal or coexisting duty to defend on the part of the ex-
cess carrier, and. . . the excess carrier must at least share in the
defense costs."' 83 The better view is that an excess insurer, unless
contractually obligated, has no duty to aid in the insured's defense
176. "Excess insurance is routinely written in the insurance industry with the expecta-
tion that the primary insurer will conduct all of the investigation, negotiation and defense
of claims until its limits are exhausted ...."
7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4682, at 28 (1979).
177. American Sur. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 Minn. 81, 142 N.W.2d
304 (1966).
178. When the value of the case greatly exceeds primary coverage and involves
excess coverage by a large proportion, the excess carrier may be forced to take the
lead, especially if there is any indication that the primary carrier has lost interest
in the defense and is simply going through the motions.
Knepper, supra note 171, at 208.
179. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. v. Coronet Ins. Co., 44 IlL App. 3d 744, 358 N.E.2d
914 (1976).
180. Bloom, Recovery From Primary Insurer by Excess Carrierfor Bad Faith Failure to
Settle, 36 INs. CouNs. J. 235, 236 (1969).
181. See Otter v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 34 CaL App. 3d 940, 109 CaL Rptr. 831
(1971).
182. See, e.g., Bettenburg v. Employers Liab. Ins. Corp., 350 F. Supp. 873 (D. Minn.
1972). Magarick condemns this approach stating that it is "only fair for the excess carrier to
share in the defense costs, because... it is unjust for the excess carrier to get a free ride as
a result of the diligence and competence of the primary insurer." P. MAGARICK, supra note
26, at 22.
183. Continental Casualty Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 27, 366 P.2d 455, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 12 (1961).
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until the primary policy limits are exceeded.1 84 If, however, the
primary insurer has wrongfully refused to defend the insured, the
excess insurer may defend. The excess carrier then is subrogated
to the insured's cause of action against the primary insurer for
failure to defend.
Practically, the excess carrier should not control the insured's
defense, at least not until the primary carrier has ceded its limits
to the excess insurer. 185 Since it is initially the primary carrier's
obligation to defend, the excess insurer, while maintaining an ac-
tive interest in the case, should allow it to do so.' 8 6 Insurance
practitioners recommend that the primary insurer willingly as-
sume the defense responsibility.
[P]rimary carriers cannot afford to prejudice their relationship
with excess carriers by trying to force them into any particular
action [e.g., to shoulder defense costs]. They need each other in
the over-all insurance picture, and acting in harmony works out
for the benefit of both of them.187
Confusion over the rights and duties of the respective insurers
also arises in the claims settlement process. A primary insurer
typically refuses to settle, thus causing the excess insurer to enter
and settle on the insured's behalf. Many cases hold that the excess
insurer is subrogated to the insured's rights and may seek redress
against the primary insurer.188 There is confusion, however, as to
whether the primary insurer owes a separate duty in tort to the
excess insurer or whether the excess insurer may seek redress only
by subrogation.1 89
The view that the excess carrier should be subrogated to the
insured's cause of action has been criticized. It is argued that the
excess insurer cannot be subrogated to the insured's claim since
the insured has suffered no monetary damage (the excess insurer
184. Commentators support this view as the better one based on the belief that: 1) the
primary carrier usually chooses counsel to defend the insured, 2) the primary insurer faces
immediate exposure in litigation; and 3) the rule has a certainty which protects the insured
better and allows premiums to be set with this cost in mind. See, e.g., German & Gal-
lagher, supra note 174, at 233.
185. "[S]ince verdicts in personal injury cases have risen to astronomical figures, the
situation is not uncommon that the primary carrier's limit is known to be exhausted at the
outset, and the excess carrier is the insurer who has the real hazard." Knepper, supra note
171, at 208.
186. Knepper, supra note 178 at 208.
187. Id. at 209.
188. See, e.g., Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347 (C.D. CoL 1974).
189. See Western World Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 140 N.J. Super. 338, 356 A.2d 83
(Law Div. 1976).
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satisfied the judgment in its insured's behalf). 19° Thus, the debate
arises over what theoretical justification there is for allowing the
excess insurer a cause of action against the primary insurer. The
two major theories are discussed below.
B. Subrogated Rights or Independent Duty?
Subrogation is an equitable remedy which generally allows a
new creditor to acquire all the rights originally held by a prior
creditor after liquidating the claim held by the prior creditor.1 91
This theory has been held to apply in the insurance context when-
ever the primary insurer breaches a duty owed to its insured, and
the excess insurer defends or settles on the insured's behalf1 92 Al-
though confrontations between primary and excess carriers are in-
creasing, 193 many excess insurers will not actively pursue their
remedies against the primary insurer. 94 A possible explanation is
that the excess insurer's cause of action, if based on subrogation, is
totally dependent on whether the insured has a bad faith cause of
action to. which the excess carrier may be subrogated1 95
Many courts have ruled that a primary insurer owes a good
190. See Note, supra note 71, at 300.
191. 11 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 176, §§ 6501, 6505. "A party claiming through subro-
gation is required to claim through a derivative right, which presupposes an original
right.. . .The party for whose benefit the doctrine of subrogation was exercised was
deemed to acquire no greater rights than those of the party for whom he was substituted."
Id. § 6506, at 445-46.
192. The primary insurer's breach of the duty to defend gives the insured a cause of
action, and in many jurisdictions, through subrogation, allows the excess insurer a right to
seek judgment for amounts expended in defense of the insured due to the primary insurer's
wrongful refusal to defend. There is an exception to this -general proposition: "Where,
however, both insurers have a contractural duty to the insured to defend, the breach by the
primary insurer does not necessarily run to the benefit of the excess carrier where it has
taken over the defense." Bloom, supra note 180, at 236. See also Continental Casualty Co.
v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862 (1976) (excess insurer subrogated to
insured's rights against primary insurer for breach of primary insurer's good faith duty to
settle).
193. Lanzone, supra note 141, at 267. The author states two major reasons underlying
the increase in disputes between primary and excess insurers. First, higher jury awards
often will exceed primary insurance limits. Second, the tendency by some primary insurers
to gamble on the outcome of a trial when the proposed settlement approaches their policy
limits.
194. In one author's opinion, "the excess carrier can and should be willing to enforce its
rights whenever a primary carrier has been negligent or has acted in bad faith in settling a
claim. So far, this has not been the case.... The excess carriers have not in the past
attempted to enforce their rights against primary carriers." Bloom, supra note 180, at 238.
195. The equitable entity subrogating is "strictly limited to the rights possessed by the
assured and can only pursue a bad faith cause of action if the assured has one." Note,
supra note 70, at 301.
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faith duty to the excess insurer. This duty requires that the pri-
mary insurer conduct the insured's defense so as not to injure the
excess insurer's rights and expose the express carrier to unwar-
ranted liability. 196 The court in St. Paul-Aercury Indemnity Co. v.
Marlin 197 stated in dicta that the primary insurer owed the same
duty of good faith and fair dealing to the excess carrier as it owed
to its insured.' 9 8 A more recent case held that the excess insurer
need not always show bad faith for a cause of action to lie against
the primary insurer.'99 If the excess insurer seeks solely to recover
the primary limit, it needs only to establish that the settlement it
arranged was "reasonable and in an amount in excess of the pri-
mary's policy limit."2"
The move to create a duty of good faith and fair dealing be-
tween the primary and excess insurers similar to the duty already
established in the primary insurer-insured relationship has been
criticized."' Due to the prevalent theoretical confusion, courts
have emphasized policy. In Continental Casualty Co. v. Reserve
Insurance Co ,202 the court held that the excess insurer was subro-
gated to the insured's rights against the primary insurer for breach
by the primary insurer of its good faith duty to settle. The court
supported its ruling on the judicial policy favoring fair settlements
and on its belief that allowing the primary insurer to avoid settle-
ment duty would produce an unfair distribution of losses among
insurers:
The insured has paid for two distinct types of coverage, un-
doubtedly at different rates because they involve different
amounts and kinds of risks .... When a primary insurer re-
196. Veneill v. Continental Gas, 433 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D.W. Va. 1977); Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co. v. Coronet Ins. Co., 44 M1. App. 3d 744, 358 N.E.2d 914 (1976); Estate of Penn.
v. Amalgamated Gen. Agencies, 148 N.J. Super. 419, 372 A.2d 1124 (App. Div. 1977).
Contra Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers' Ins. Group, 76 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 415 (1978) (endorsed subrogation as the only basis on which excess insurer may re-
cover against the primary insurer).
197. 190 F,2d 455 (10th Cir. 1951).
198. The court stated that the primary insurer "was required under its relationship to
its insured and the excess insurer, to exercise good faith in determining whether an offer of
compromise of settlement should be accepted or rejected. It owed them the duty to exercise
an honest discretion at the risk of liability beyond its policy limits." Id. at 457.
199. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 76 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 415 (1978).
200. Kurland & Simon, supra note 144, at 555. If the excess carrier seeks to recoveran
amount greater than the primary insurer's policy limits, then it must show that the primary
insurer declined to contribute its policy limits in bad faith.
201. See, e.g., Note, supra note 70, at 302.
202. 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862 (1976).
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fuses in bad faith to settle, it forces the excess insurer [into]
making a reasonable settlement to cover both primary and ex-
cess liability. Thus, the purposes of the different kinds of cov-
erage and their rating structures are thwarted as the excess
insurer bears the full loss and fulfills the primary insurer's duty
to the insured as well as its own.20
3
Primary carriers argue that this judicial perspective forces them to
concede to unwise settlements under pressure exerted by overanx-
21ious excess insurers. ° Courts have discounted this fear, stating
that the insured or its excess insurer, to collect damages, must
show that the settlement which the primary insurer rejected was
negotiated in good faith and for a reasonable amount. 5
The theoretical battle over the proper scope of the excess and
primary insurer's relationship continues among commentators
and courts. The advocates of subrogation view the excess insurer
as a third party beneficiary to the contract between the primary
insurer and the insured. 20 6 This view was adopted in American
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. All American Bus Lines, Inc..207 The
court recognized that although the primary insurer owed no con-
tractual duty to the excess insurer, the excess carrier still must be
subrogated to the insured's rights when it pays out policy proceeds
normally covered by the primary insurance contract.20 8 The court
believed that the primary insurer's refusal to settle in good faith
distorts the equities between the two insurers and, therefore, it is
"just and equitable for [the primary insurer] to bear the loss occa-
sioned by its own misconduct." 2"
Opponents of subrogation reject the doctrine as "failing to
achieve evenhanded justice. ' 210 The court in Transit Casualty Co.
v. Spink Corp.21' embraced a policy of "triangular reciprocity"
whereby insurers are no longer forced to use the insured as a step-
203. Id. at 9-10, 238 N.W.2d at 865.
204. "Ifa primary carrier feels that the claim should be refused entirely or is not worth
the underlying limits, an excess carrier offering its limits puts the primary carrier in an
extremely awkward position." Brittle, supra note 22, at 319.
205. See, ag., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864
(1976). See also supra note 200.
206. The primary insurer "ignored the duty owed to the insured and the excess insurer
as a third party beneficiary and that the breach of duty many [sic] have been a tort as well."
7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 176, § 4682, at 33.
207. 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1951).
208. Id. at 238. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
209. 190 F.2d at 238.
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ping stone to each other. Triangular reciprocity recognizes the du-
ties and obligations of all the parties and allows them to work
together to achieve settlement.212
Providing an excess insurer with subrogation rights has been
said to allow the excess insurer to recover on tenuous theoretical
grounds. One argument is that if there is excess insurance in-
volved, the insured's interests are never endangered since the ex-
cess insurer owes a duty to protect the insured.21 3 Since the
insured suffers no real loss, there is no bad faith action to which
the excess insurer may be subrogated. 21a The application of sub-
rogation in this context also has been said to give the excess in-
surer a "windfall," since it is being compensated for liability
payments for which it accepted premium payments. Furthermore,
"the ultimate subsidizer of litigation between primary and excess
carriers would be the assured through the medium of higher pre-
miums . ,,215 The court in Universal Underwriters Insurance
Co. v. Dairyland Mutual Insurance Co., 216 followed this "windfall"
view. The court stated, "[t]here is no privity of contract between
these two insurance companies nor is there any principle of law of
which we are aware that would give [the excess insurer] such a
windfall because of [the primary insurer's] mistreatment of its
assured.
2 17
Commentators have criticized subrogating the excess carrier to
the insured's cause of action for a primary insurer's breach of its
good faith duty. It is argued that the good faith duty is imposed on
the primary insurer to protect the insured from excess liability.21 8
Since the excess insurer is presumably more sophisticated than an
ordinary insured, it is ludicrous to extend protection to the excess
insurer that was intended originally for the average policy-
holder.21 9 One commentator has made the following observation
212. "[The two carriers face interacting problems of claim adjustment, settlement and
defense. Each has a choice of mutual support or naked self-interest. The law, then, would
be unrealistic in demanding that either carrier use the policyholder as its stepping stone to
each other. Triangular reciprocity is far more rational." 94 Cal. App. 3d at 133, 156 Cal.
Rptr. at 365.
213. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
215. Note, supra note 70, at 305.
216. 102 Ariz. 518, 433 P.2d 966 (1967).
217. Id. at 520, 433 P.2d at 968.
218. See Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers' Ins. Group, 76 Cal. App. 3d at 1043,
143 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
219. See Knepper, supra note 178, at 210.
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in concluding that there is no justification to support the imposi-
tion of this independent duty on the primary insurer:
There is simply no pervasive policy reason why an excess car-
rier should receive a "windfall" from a newly formulated appli-
cation of the standard of good faith, and absent such a policy
rationale, [courts] should not extend the bad faith cause of ac-
tion to the primary excess carrier suit.'2 °
The above discussion demonstrates flaws in applying either the
subrogation or the good faith doctrine in the context of the excess-
primary insurer relationship. The subrogation doctrine has been
termed an "ancient artificiality" which leads to undesirable "all-
or-nothing" results.22 Since there is no contractual privity be-
tween the two insurers, the excess insurer's cause of action de-
pends solely on the insured's rights.
Courts which equate the excess-primary and the primary-in-
sured relationships often find that the equities between the pri-
mary and excess insurers are unequal, and subrogating all the
insured's rights is the proper remedy.222 Courts which find that
the equities between the two insurers are equal generally deny the
excess insurer any cause of action against the primary insurer.
223
Other courts have attempted to expand the primary insurer's duty
of good faith and fair dealing to include the excess insurer. The
policy behind this duty is the protection of the insured. The fun-
damental tenet underlying the imposition of the duty is that the
average policyholder is presumed to have little knowledge about
the workings of insurance and, therefore, is held to a slight degree
of care in protecting his or her interest.224 It is a tenuous exten-
sion to use the same rationale to justify the application of the good
faith doctrine for the benefit of the excess insurer.
While none of the theoretical bases discussed above appears
wholly satisfactory, some standard must be formulated whereby
both the insured's and excess insurer's legitimate interests will be
protected. The proper solution may be to develop an independent
duty between the primary and excess insurer, the breach of which
will give rise to a tort action. This duty must be reciprocal so that
220. Note, supra note 70, at 305.
221. Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d at 132-33, 156 Cal. Rptr. at
365-66.
222. See, ag., American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. All Am. Bus Lines, Inc., 190 F.2d
234 (10th Cir. 1951).
223. See, ag., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 252 S.C.
428, 166 S.E.2d 762 (1969).
224. Knepper, supra note 171, at 210.
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neither insurer will act contrary to the other's interests in handling
claims against their common insured. The creation of a new tort
duty will serve important public policy functions including en-
couraging out-of-court settlements and providing adequate pro-
tection of the insured. This duty will eliminate the confusion and
inconsistency caused by judicial attempts to apply either the good
faith or subrogation doctrines to the primary-excess insurer
relationship.
Whether based on a duty of good faith and fair dealing, subro-
gation, or the creation of an independent tort duty, it is apparent
that a clear judicial elaboration of the rights and duties of and
between primary and excess insurers is needed. 225 Given that jury
awards continue to be astronomical,226 instances where primary
and excess insurers handle the same claim also are increasing. It is
in both insurers' interests to define the extent of their relationship
and the proximity in which they should work to resolve claims
against common insureds.
In an attempt to resolve some of the problems extant in the
primary-excess insurer relationship, the insurance industry has
promulgated a code of conduct to establish a uniform working
relationship among primary and excess insurers.227 These guide-
225. See Note, supra note 70, at 305.
226. Bloom, supra note 180, at 235.
227. 1-The primary insurer must discharge its duty of investigating promptly and
diligently even those cases in which it is apparent that its policy limit may
be consumed.
2-Liability must be assessed on the basis of all relevant facts which a dili-
gent investigation can develop and in the light of applicable legal princi-
ples. The assessment of liability must be reviewed periodically
throughout the life of the claim.
3-Evaluation must be realistic and without regard to the policy limit.
4-When from evaluation of all aspects of a claim, settlement is indicated, the
primary insurer must proceed promptly to attempt a settlement, up to its
policy limit if necessary, negotiating seriously and with an open mind.
5-If at any time, it should reasonably appear that the insured may be ex-
posed beyond the primary limit, the primary insurer shall give prompt
written notice to the excess insurer, when known, stating the results of
investigation and negotiation, and giving any other information deemed
relevant to a determination of the exposure, and inviting the excess in-
surer to participate in a common effort to dispose of the claim.
6-Where the assessment of damages, considered alone, would reasonably
support payment of a demand within the primary policy limit but the pri-
mary insurer is unwilling to pay the demand because of its opinion that
liability either does not "exist or is questionable and the primary insurer
recognizes the possibility of a verdict in excess of its policy limit, it shall
give notice of its position to the excess insurer when known. It shall make
available its file to the excess insurer for examination, if requested.
7-The primary insurer shall never seek a contribution to a settlement within
its policy limit from the excess insurer. It may, however, accept contribu-
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lines outline the specific duties of both the primary and excess in-
surer and provide each insurer with suggested standards of
conduct in handling common claims.228 The guidelines give the
primary insurer the option of either appealing an excess judgment
or paying its policy limits to the excess insurer. The excess insurer
has the option of appealing at its own expense or paying the judg-
ment balance.229 While this proposal may place the burden of ap-
peal costs on the excess insurer, it is arguably equitable since it is
the primary insurer's obligation to defend the insured in the origi-
nal action.230 The primary insurer may argue that it has dis-
charged its obligation to the insured through its diligent
investigation and subsequent handling of the insured's case at
trial. If the excess insurer seeks to appeal an adverse judgment, the
tion to a settlement within its policy limit from the excess insurer when
such contribution is voluntarily offered.
8-In the event of a judgment in excess of the primary policy limit the pri-
mary insurer shall consult the excess insurer as to further procedure. If
the primary insurer undertakes an appeal with the concurrence of the ex-
cess insurer the expense shall be shared by the primary and the excess
insurer in such manner as they may agree upon. In the absence of such an
agreement, they shall share the expense in the same proportions that their
respective shares of the outstanding judgment bear to the total amount of
the judgment. If the primary insurer should elect not to appeal, taking
appropriate steps to pay or to guarantee payment of its policy limit, it
shall not be liable for the expense of the appeal or interest on the judg-
ment from the time it gives notice to the excess insurer of its election not
to appeal and tenders its policy limit. The excess insurer may then prose-
cute an appeal at its own expense being liable also for interest accruing on
the entire judgment subsequent to the primary insurer's notice of its elec-
tion not to appeal. If the excess insurer does not agree to an appeal it shall
not be liable to share the cost of any appeal prosecuted by the primary
insurer.
9-The excess insurer shall refrain from coercive or collusive conduct
designed to force a settlement. It shall never make formal demand upon a
primary insurer that the latter settle a claim within its policy limit. In any
subsequent proceedings between excess insurer and primary insurer the
failure of the excess insurer to make formal demand that the claim be
settled shall not be considered as having any bearing on the excess in-
surer's claim against the primary insurer.
These guidelines were promulgated by the Claims Executive Council of the American In-
surance Association and the American Mutual Insurance Alliance in 1974, and are re-
printed in P. MAGARICK, supra note 26, at 216-18.
228. Id.
229. Id. Guideline eight reads in pertinent part:
If the primary insurer should elect not to appeal, taking appropriate steps to pay
or guarantee payment of its policy limit, it shall not be liable for the expense of
the appeal or interest on the judgment from the time it gives notice to the excess
insurer of its election not to appeal and tenders its policy limit. The excess insurer
may then prosecute an appeal at its own expense ....
.d. at 217-18.
230. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
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primary insurer should not be forced to share the burden of ap-
peal costs after having tendered its policy limits.
Several excess carriers have criticized the proposed guidelines
for permitting the primary insurer to disclaim one of its funda-
mental duties to the insured-the duty to defend.231 Some courts
have held that the primary insurer's duty to defend ceases once it
has paid the policy limits. 232 The better view, however, is that the
duty to defend is a separate insurance agreement and the primary
insurer must defend regardless of the potential that its policy lim-
its will be exhausted.233 As one commentator has noted, "The fact
that there is an excess insurer should not alter the obligation of the
primary insurer who has a responsibility to the insured as well as
to the excess insurer."234 The proposed guidelines would allow
the primary insurer to escape responsibility for the insured's de-
fense by tendering the policy limits. This provision would create
the undesirable result that the insured's defense or appeal would
be handled by attorneys unfamiliar with the case.235
Commentators favor adoption of the guidelines so insurers
may "clean their own house" without further judicial interfer-
ence.236 The adoption of an industry-wide standard would not to-
tally resolve conflicts among insurers, but it would demonstrate
that the insurance industry is "ready to adopt the most stringent
standards of conduct by seeking to diligently represent its insured




Most judicial intervention in insured-insurer disputes has been
directed toward protecting the interests of the insured.23s This ju-
dicial intervention resulted in imposing a fiduciary responsibility
231. See Lanzone, supra note 141, at 278.
232. 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 176, § 4682, at 34 n.55.
233. Id. at 35.
234. Id. at 32-33.
235. Id. at 37. See also Knepper, supra note 171, at 209 (excess insurer may be forced
to assume defense of case when primary insurer turns the matter over to inexperienced
attorney or one with a poor trial record).
236. The proposed guidelines "provide standards of conduct which, if followed by in-
surers in the handling of claims, will reduce if not eliminate the incidence of controversy
between primary and excess insurers [and] provide a format for the resolution of problems
involving the interaction of primary and excess insurance coverages and their applicable
policy limits." P. MAGARiCK, supra note 26, at 216.
237. Brittle, supra note 23, at 326.
238. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
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on insurers to act on the insured's behalf to avoid excess liability
judgments against the insured. Thus, it effectively has prodded
the insurance industry to recognize its responsibility to in-
sureds.3 9 This recognition is evidenced by the industry's attempt
to control its conduct through self-regulation.240 Furthermore, the
insurance industry cannot function effectively without utilizing its
expertise and exercising control over claims against its insureds. 41
In response to higher liability judgments, the insurance rela-
tionship has expanded to include the insured, primary insurer,
and excess insurer.2 42 Just as early twentieth century courts ig-
nored the economic reality inherent in the relationship between a
dominant insurer and a relatively powerless insured,243 modem
courts must be sensitive to attempts by any of the parties in this
triangular relationship to engage in self-serving activities at the
other two parties' expense.
The appropriate role of courts in insured-insurer disputes is to
maintain a proper balance between the legitimate interests of the
insured, the insurer, and those who are affected indirectly by the
impact of individual decisions. The insurance system is most ef-
fective when the insurer's need to have exclusive control over its
claim fund is balanced with the insured's need to have his or her
claim handled so as to avoid personal liability.
The courts faced an equally difficult challenge in balancing the
legitimate interests of primary and excess insurers. This task has
been difficult because the only link between the two companies is
their common insured.244 The theories which courts have devel-
oped to protect the relatively unsophisticated insured, however,
will not protect the legitimate interests of sophisticated profes-
sional insurance companies.
Courts should not adopt standards subrogating the excess in-
surer to the rights and claims of the average policyholder to rem-
edy injury to the excess insurer by the primary insurer.24 5 It is
inappropriate to define the scope of an excess insurer's rights by
reference to whatever rights its insured has against his or her pri-
mary insurer.24 For these same reasons, the duty of good faith
239. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
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and fair dealing, developed to protect the insured, should not be
made applicable in wholesale fashion to the excess insurer.247 In-
stead, courts must develop a new standard based on an independ-
ent duty sounding in tort to govern the primary-excess insurer
relationship.248
THEODORE J. Tucci
247. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
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